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RECENT DECISIONS
FEDERAL PRACTICE - DOCTRINE OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
HELD TO BE A MATTER OF SUBSTANTIVE LAw UNAFFECTED BY
AMENDED RULE 19.- As a result of an automobile accident, two
separate actions against the owner and driver jointly were pending
before a state court. A third action, arising from the same
accident, was instituted in a federal district court against the driver
alone and resulted in a default judgment. Thereafter, another
action for a declaratory judgment was commenced in the federal
district court in which all the parties except the owner were joined
and in which it was held that the driver was operating the vehicle
within the scope of his authority and was thus an "insured" within
the meaning of the owner's policy. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, reversing, held sua sponte that since the owner was
an indispensable party and no decree could be rendered to protect
his interest in either the federal or state actions, his non-joinder
was error. The Court explained that the indispensable party
doctrine is a matter of substantive law, and therefore could not be
altered by Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,
dismissal of the action was required. Provident Tradesinens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d 802 (3d
Cir. 1966).
Under common-law procedure, those who had joint rights or
liabilities were required to be joined as parties.' Thus, joint
obligees had to bring an action for damages on a contract right
together,' and joint obligors had to be made joint defendants in an
action at law. 3  Exceptions were made when one of the joint
obligors was an infant,4 a silent partner,5 dead,6 or discharged by
operation of law.' In tort actions, plaintiffs who had joint interests
' Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C.C. 276, 29 Eng. Rep. 151 (Ch. 1787).
Although offering only dictum on the point, Fell has been referred to as
the embodiment of a rule of long standing. See Farmer v. Curtis, 2
Sim. 466, 57 Eng. Rep. 862 (Ch. 1829); Palk v. Clinton, 12 Ves. Jun. 48, 33
Eng. Rep. 19 (Rolls 1805). Prior to Fell the English Chancery Courts
had employed a pragmatic approach to joinder issues. See Hazard,.
Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Pro~edilral Plrntom,
61 CoLuMt. L. REv. 1254 (1961).
2See Slingsby's Case, 5 Co. Rep. l8b, 77 Eng. Rep. 77 (1588).
3Keller v. Blasdel, 1 Nev. 491 (1865).
4Burgess v. Merill, 4 Taunt. 468, 128 Eng. Rep. 410 (1812).
5 Tomlinson v. Spencer, 5 Cal. 291 (1855).
6Murphy's Adm'rs v. Branch Bank, 5 Ala. 421 (1843).
7 1vey v. Gamble, 8 Ala. Rep. (7 Port.) 545 (1838).
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were required to join in order to bring an action for damages,s
while, generally, joint tort-feasors could be sued either jointly9 or
severally,10 at the plaintiff's option.
This indispensable party doctrine, requiring a court to dismiss
in the absence of certain interested parties, was recognized by the
federal courts in Joy v. Wirtz." In that case, several creditors
had executed a release of their claims against the defendant and
two of them brought an action to rescind. The defendant's de-
murrer for non-joinder of all the creditors was sustained since the
court reasoned that it could not set aside the release as to some of
the creditors and leave it operative as to the others. The plaintiffs
were permitted to amend the complaint to join all the creditors
except one whose citizenship would have defeated federal jurisdic-
tion based upon diversity of citizenship.' 2  The defendant again
demurred, and the court, although recognizing the common-law
doctrine, allowed the action to proceed believing it could frame the
decree so as not to affect the rights of the absent party.
Courts of equitable jurisdiction developed more flexible and
pragmatic compulsory joinder requirements. The object of the
requirements in the equity courts was to settle an entire controversy
in one action when this could be done conveniently and without
prejudice to any of the parties.'3 In Russell v. Clarke's Ex'rs,14
an action for the construction of, and a determination of liability
under, a letter of credit, the United States Supreme Court decided
that a final decree could not be entered on the merits unless all
parties who had an essential and substantially affected interest were
joined.15
The United States Supreme Court, in Shields v. Barrow 6
defined indispensable and necessary parties in terms that are still
accepted today. Indispensable parties are:
s Gallatin & N. Turnpike Co. v. Fry, 88 Tenn. 296, 12 S.W. 720
(1889).
0 Colegrove v. New York & N.H.LR., 20 N.Y. 492, 7 N.Y. Supp. 878
(1859).
10 Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29, 128 Eng. Rep. 943 (1815).
1 13 Fed. Cas. 1172 (No. 7553), rehearing, 13 Fed. Cas. 1172 (No. 7554)
(C.C.D. Pa. 1806).
12 Non-joinder of an interested party whose joinder would defeat diver-
sity jurisdiction is the traditional problem that faces the federal courts.
The more typical problem facing all courts, both federal and state, is
non-joinder of a party who is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
court.
13 City Bank v. Bartlett, 71 Ga. 797 (1883).
14 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 69 (1812).
t Id. at 98.
1058 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854). The Supreme Court in Shields
was construing a statute, Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 1, 5 Stat. 321,
which provided:
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persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an
interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without
either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience.
1 7
Necessary parties are:
persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be
made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which
requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy,
and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it . . .
[but whose] interests are separable from those of the parties before
the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete
and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the
court .... "I
The essence of the Court's formulation is that if a court may
enter a meaningful decree without affecting the absent party's
interest, that party is at most a necessary party; if a court is unable
to do so, then the absent party is indispensable. 19
Citing Shields for the classification of parties, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Washington v. United States, 20 established
the criteria for determining whether a party is necessary or indis-
pensable. After determining that a party is interested in the
controversy, the court must answer four questions:
(1) Is the interest of the absent party distinct and severable?
That where, in any suit at law or in equity, commenced in any
court of the United States, there shall be several defendants, any one
or more of whom shall not be inhabitants of or found within the
district where the suit is brought or shall not voluntarily appear
thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain jurisdiction,
and proceed to the trial and adjudication of such suit, between
the parties who may be properly before it; but the judgment
or decree rendered therein shall not conclude or prejudice other
parties, not regularly served with process, or not voluntarily ap-
pearing to answer; and the nonjoinder of parties who are not so
inhabitants, or found within the district, shall constitute no matter
of abatement, or other objection to said suit.
17 Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129, 139 (1854).
is Ibid. There is also a third class of parties-those whose relation
"to the matter in controversy, merely formal or otherwise, [is such] that
while they may be called proper parties, the court will take no account
of the omission to make them parties." Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 280, 284 (1867).
19 Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MicH.
L. REv. 327, 342-43 (1957).
20 87 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936).
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(2) In the absence of such party, can the court render justice between
the parties before it?
(3) Will the decree made, in the absence of such party, have no
injurious effect on the interest of such absent party?
(4) Will the final determination, in the absence of such party, be
consistent with equity and good conscience?
21
If all the questions cannot be answered affirmatively, then the
absent party is indispensable and his non-joinder will warrant a
dismissal.
The approach of the equity courts to the indispensable party
doctrine is characterized by extreme flexibility. For example, in
Elnendorf v. Taylor,22 the plaintiff, one of several cotenants, was
allowed to sue in equity without the joinder of his cotenants who
were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the court. The Court
noted the desirability of bringing all interested parties before it
so as to finally settle the controversy, but stated that the application
of the indispensable party doctrine was discretionary in the interests
of justice.2 3  Mallow v. Hinde2 4 cited Elmendorf with approval,
but held that there was no dispensing with a party whose rights
lie at the very foundation of plaintiff's claim of right and whose
interests will be directly affected and prejudiced.2 5  In dictum,
however, the Court stated that it might be possible, in the interest
of justice, to grant some relief through the use of a decree con-
tingent upon a favorable adjudication for the plaintiff over the
absent parties, or, in the alternative, a retention of jurisdiction
pending other developments. 6
This concept of shaping the decree to avoid the hardship of
dismissal for non-joinder has been applied where the plaintiff sought
specific equitable relief. For example, in an action for rescission
of a contract in which several of the parties to the agreement were
not joined, it was held that the trial court before dismissing
should first consider whether alternative relief could be granted
which would not affect the interests of an absent party.2 7  In
.Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Nickel,28 the court stated that where specific
relief is sought and, if granted, would adversely affect the interests
of the absent party, "the court can award damages in lieu [of
specific relief] . . . and frame its decree so as to protect the
21 Id. at 428.
2223 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152 (1825).
23 Id. at 166-67.
2425 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193 (1827).
25 Id. at 198.
26 See id. at 198-99.
27 Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
28 141 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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interests of those absent parties." 29 The possibility of shaping the
decree so as to protect absent parties also has application in cases
where the plaintiff sought relief at law.30
Among the factors which are weighed to determine whether
a party is indispensable is the inconvenience of a dismissal to the
plaintiff, including whether or not the plaintiff will be left without
a forum in which to vindicate his rights.3 1 In Kroese v. General
Steel Castings Corp.,3 2 the plaintiff sued the defendant corporation
for a declaration of dividends. The plaintiff could not obtain
jurisdiction over a majority of the board of directors in any state
or federal court. The lower court, reasoning that it could not grant
relief without the joinder of a majority, dismissed the action. The
court of appeals reversed, concluding that the decision of the court
as to whether dividends should be declared was substituted for the
independent business judgment of the board; the only function to
be performed by the board, then, was the recording of the decree
in the minutes book-a ministerial function. The court was aware
of the fact that enforcement of its decree without in personam
jurisdiction over a majority of the board would be difficult. How-
ever, this difficulty was counterbalanced by the complete absence of
any forum where such jurisdiction could be obtained. Thus, the
court concluded that by virtue of its power over the defendant's
property within the state, relief could be effectively granted.
Other interests of the plaintiff, besides the lack of a forum,
have been considered important by the courts. In A.L. Smith Iron
Co. v. Dickson,33 the plaintiff sought to declare a patent invalid
and sued the licensee without joinder of the licensor-patentee. The
court felt that the potential detriment of a judgment of invalidity
against the patentee could be obviated by according him an oppor-
tunity to intervene and, with this opportunity, his sole remaining
interest in a dismissal for his non-joinder was choice of forum.
The court, however, held that the interest of the present plaintiff
to obtain a speedy adjudication outweighed this interest of the
patentee and allowed the case to proceed.
The Supreme Court, in 1934, promulgated the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure under the authority of enabling legislation 3 4
291d. at 46. Accord, Hudson v. Newell, 172 F.2d 848, 850 (5th Cir.
1949).
30 Roos v. Texas Co., 23 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277
U.S. 587 (1928). Accord, Kendig v. Dean, 97 U.S. 423 (1878). See also
Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921),
cert. denied, 257 U.S. 661 (1922).
31 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Haynes, 241 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1957); Fouke
v. Schenewerk, 197 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1952).
32 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950).
33 141 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1944).
34 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
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which specifically withheld from the Court the power to modify,
abridge or enlarge substantive law or rights.35 In adopting the
rules, equity and law in the federal courts were merged under a
single set of procedural rules.36 As first promulgated in 1934, rule
19, dealing with joinder, provided that persons who have joint
interests shall be made parties. In addition, persons who are not
indispensable, but who are needed to provide complete relief be-
tween the joined parties and who are within the jurisdiction of the
court, can be summoned to appear.3 7  However, in its discretion,
the court may proceed without them if jurisdiction can only be
obtained voluntarily or if joinder would deprive the court of juris-
diction. This rule provided that if such parties were not joined,
the judgment rendered would not affect their rights or liabilities.
Rule 19 incorporated language which had been construed as not
affecting the substantive principles for the determination of indis-
pensable parties.3 s  Subsequent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court 39 and of the lower federal courts 40 have followed
a practical application of the principles referred to in Shields.
Thus, the law of indispensability remained virtually unchanged by
the enactment of the Federal Rules.
By an amendment, effective July 1, 1966, rule 19 was sig-
nificantly changed.41 Subdivision (a) now provides that a person
should be joined (1) if complete relief cannot be given the joined
parties, or (2) if the absent "party's" ability to protect an interest
will be impeded or if his future action might expose parties already
joined to double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.
In addition, subdivision (b) of rule 19 now specifies four factors
to be considered by the court in determining whether or not to
proceed in the absence of a person described in subdivision (a).
They are:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
3GIbid. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1941).
3,3FED. P. Civ. P. 1, 2 (1958).
37 FED R. Civ. P. 19 (1958).
3s Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Federal
Rule 19, 74 YAL L.J. 403, 409-11 (1965).
39 See, e.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
4 0 E.g., Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F2d 775 (1st Cir. 1964); L.O. Koven
& Brother, Inc. v. Local 5767, United Steelworkers of America, 250 F.
Supp. 810 (D.N.J. 1966).
41 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (1958), with FED. 1. Civ. P. 19
(Supp. 1966).
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absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.42
The change in the rule, as indicated by the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note,43 is an attempt to state affirmatively in subdivision
(b) the factors relevant in determining whether an action should
proceed or be dismissed when the joinder of interested persons is
not feasible. However, the fact that an adjudication will, as a
practical matter, adversely affect an absent person or leave a party
exposed to possible inconsistent recovery by the absent person is
only one factor to be considered on the issue of indispensability.
Similarly, the "shaping of relief" provision was intended to be
used as a method of lessening prejudice and was considered by
the committee to be a "familiar expedient" for obtaining such a
result.
44
In the instant case, 45 the decedent's estate brought a declara-
tory judgment action to determine whether the person driving the
vehicle in which deceased was killed was covered under the owner's
insurance policy. The policy's coverage extended only to those
driving the car with the owner's permission. The critical issue
was whether or not the driver was using the vehicle within the
scope of this permission. Defendant insurance company had not
defended in another suit brought against the driver's estate by
the plaintiff herein, and a default judgment had been obtained.
Dutcher, the owner of the automobile, was being sued in a state
court by the plaintiff here, and was not joined in the instant action.
The district court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff since,
in Pennsylvania, the presumption is that a dead man was operating
a borrowed vehicle within the scope of his permission; this pre-
sumption had not been rebutted. Although Dutcher was ruled
incompetent to testify as to the scope of the permission since his
interest was adverse to the plaintiff's estate, he was permitted to
testify in a phase of the trial concerning a passenger not fatally
injured. As to this facet of the trial, a jury had found that the
driver had not used the automobile beyond the scope of his per-
mission.
The Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, advanced two reasons
for reversing the lower court's finding: first, the failure to join
the owner was a fatal error in that he was an indispensable party,
and, second, in view of the pending state court actions in which
the question of coverage would be decided, the district court should
.
42 FED. k :CIv. P. 19(b) (Supp. 1966).
4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 779-84 (1966).
44 Id. at 782.4aProvident Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,
365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966).
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have denied relief without consideration of the merits. The Court
stated that a declaratory judgment proceeding is procedural and
not equitable in nature and that, while equitable principles are an
element in a determination of indispensability, they "are not
operative" where the element of potentially drastic "injurious effect"
to the interest of the absent party is present.46  The Court rea-
soned that a party is indispensable when his rights may be affected
and the court cannot proceed without him. Supported by the
district court's finding that the owner's interest in the policy was
adverse to the plaintiff's, the Court held that it was practically
impossible to protect the owner in a decree since his interests were
so entangled with those of the joined parties. Moreover, there
was no precedent for fashioning a decree which would protect the
absent party while settling the issue between the parties before the
Court. The Court concluded that one whose interests or rights
will be adversely affected has a substantive right to be joined which
cannot be abridged by procedural rules and held that the district
court should not have proceeded in view of the fact that its finding
as to the action's potentially drastic effect upon the owner made him
an indispensable party.
The dissent stated that declaring one an indispensable party
is a conclusion premised upon the failure of the court to proceed
with the action after various factors are considered. Arguing that
indispensability is not determined by academic or mechanical classi-
fication but rather depends on all the elements which bear on the
case, the dissent maintained that the action should not be dismissed
if an effective judgment could be molded without adversely affecting
the absent party. It was the dissent's position that preserving the
verdict would only adversely affect the owner if the total judgments
obtained in both the federal and state proceedings should exceed
the policy's limits. In that event, the owner would have a right to
make his claim of superiority to the proceeds of the policy for
indemnity. Also, a race to the proceeds could be prevented by a
provision in the decree forbidding the insurer to make any pay-
ments until the owner had presented his claims for indemnity. The
dissent was highly critical of the majority's failure to apply rule 19
pragmatically and to consider the crucial factors of the case: (1)
the time factor-eight years had elapsed since the date of the
accident; (2) the factual determination which will have to be
retried with no new evidence or circumstances; (3) the possibility
of no actual conflict between the owner and driver since the policy
limits may not be exceeded; (4) the failure of the owner to
intervene under rule 24-presumably so that he would not be
bound by an adverse determination but would reap the benefits
-Id. at 809.
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of a favorable one; and (5) that the issue of non-joinder was not
raised by the parties but by the Court itself.4 7
Under the concept of indispensability adopted by the Court
in the instant case, the application of recently amended Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is restricted. In classifying
the indispensable party doctrine as substantive law, the Court
adds unnecessary doctrinal confusion to the pragmatic essence of
the test of who is an indispensable party and who is merely a
necessary party. Under prior law, if the court could render a
decree between the present parties that would not injure the
absent party, there would be no need to dismiss the action for
failure to join. In the instant case, the Court stated that "equitable
considerations are an element of the criteria to be applied in de-
termining whether a party is indispensable but they are not opera-
tive where the element of 'injurious effect on the interest of the
absent party' is present." 48  This approach begs the question of
what causes and what can prevent the injurious effect on this
absent party. This conclusion, superimposed on the .Court's concept
of indispensability as a question of substantive law, will tend to
restrict the pragmatic approach intended by the revisors of rule 19.
It seems that the Court did not give sufficient consideration to
whether some kind of an unprejudicial decree could be fashioned.
Furthermore, the restrictive approach of the majority seems
contrary to the intent of the revisors of rule 19. The revisors
sought to have "the case . . . examined pragmatically and a choice
made between the alternatives of proceeding with the action in the
absence of particular interested persons, and dismissing the
action." 49 It has been urged that the classification of Shields be
abandoned in favor of a balancing of competing interests on a case
by case basis.50
The majority contended that rule 19 was inapplicable since it
could not affect substantive rights. However, it seems that rule 19
could properly be considered a mere codification of federal deci-
sional law on indispensability rather than a vehicle to change
substantive rights. That the rule was merely a codification can be
seen by examining its provisions in light of the case law of
indispensable parties. The first factor to be considered by a court
under rule 19(b) is the extent of possible prejudice to the absent
party. It has been held that if the court can proceed to a mean-
ingful decree without affecting the interest of the absent person,
47 Id. at 816 (dissenting opinion).481d. at 809. (Emphasis added.)
49U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 779 (1966).
50 Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Cizil Actions, 55 MicH.
L. REv. 327, 356 (1957).
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that absent person is, at most, a necessary party.5 ' The second
factor, which is closely related to the first, is the possibility of
reducing the prejudice to absent parties by protective provisions
or the shaping of relief. This factor indicates that there may be
devices short of an outright judgment for either party which will
not affect the absent party and yet will provide a meaningful
determination. This factor is an important consideration where
specific relief, such as rescission, is sought and not all parties to the
agreement are joined. By awarding money damages in lieu of the
specific remedy sought and by shaping the decree to protect the
absent parties, courts have avoided the indispensable party doctrine.5 2
The other factors enumerated in amended rule 19 are whether
adequate relief can be granted in the absence of third parties, and
whether there is any forum in which the plaintiff can join all
"indispensable" persons. It is submitted that all these factors are
inherent in the traditional test for determining who are indis-
pensable parties. In fact, one of the purposes of the new rule was
to permit the courts to retain a case to determine whether or not,
considering all the above mentioned factors, they should proceed
or dismiss.
However, upon application of rule 19(b) to the facts of the
case, it appears that a result identical to that of the instant case
would have been warranted. Under this subdivision, a court's
first inquiry is whether there is prejudice to the absent party.
Here, a judgment for the plaintiff would definitely be prejudicial
to the owner since if the proceeds are applied to satisfy the plain-
tiff's judgment against the driver, and judgments are later entered
in the state court against the owner and driver jointly, less of the
proceeds are available to satisfy these state claims. Secondly, the
court must determine if the interests of the absent party can be
protected by the decree. In this case such protection is possible
by holding payments in abeyance until a determination is had in
the state courts. However, a third factor, i.e., whether the plaintiff
will have another forum in which to pursue a remedy, seems to
militate against shaping a decree in such manner. Since the state
courts are open to him and he could easily consolidate his action
with the others pending there, there would be a great conservation
of judicial effort coupled with a certitude of consistent results.
One problem that frequently arises in joining indispensable
parties in federal practice which may have had a bearing on the
Court's attitude in the instant case is that such joinder threatens
5'Roos v. Texas Co., supra note 30; Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co., supra note 30.
52 See, e.g., Miller & Lix, Inc. v. Nickel, 141 F. Supp. 41 (N.D.
Cal. 1956).
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to defeat the jurisdictional diversity and venue requirements of the
federal courts. This problem could be alleviated if Congress would
modify these requirements as it has for interpleader 5 3 and third-
party actions," so that joinder of a non-diverse indispensable party
would not divest the federal court of jurisdiction. The same would
be true of venue. In this way, one of the more serious problems
inherent in the indispensable party doctrine would be eliminated
and the doctrine made more practical and workable in the federal
courts.
Considering the above application of rule 19(b) to the instant
case, the end result should not be criticized. However, the broad
holding of the Court could militate against a flexible application
of rule 19(b), while a discretionary dismissal would have been in
accord with the intent of the revisors and applicable case law.
IMMIGRATION - RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION - ALIENS WITH
FAMILIAL TIES AND WHO WILFULLY EVADED QUOTA RESTRICTIONS
ARE "OTHERWISE ADMISSIBLE" AT TIME OF ENTRY. - Two aliens
separately entered the United States by misrepresenting their
immigrant quota status; thereafter, each became a parent of an
American citizen. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
ordered the aliens deported on the ground that they were "exclud-
able at entry" as not having been of the proper status under the
quota specified by the immigrant visa. The aliens had contended
that they were nevertheless saved from deportation by Section
241 (f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act which exempts
aliens who enter fraudulently, who have close familial relationships
with American citizens, and who were "otherwise admissible" at
time of entry. On review of the respective cases, the courts of
appeals came to an opposite conclusion. In resolving the conflict,
the United States Supreme Court concluded that neither alien
was deportable, holding that although they had misrepresented
their quota status for the purpose of evading the quota restrictions,
the aliens were nevertheless "otherwise admissible" at the time of
entry. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214
(1966).
With the exception of the Alien Act of 1798, which allowed
the President to order the deportation of any alien he deemed
5328 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).
54 Williams v. Keyes, 125 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
699 (1942).
[ VOL. 42
